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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
surety's rights. Public contracts, however, should not be completed at the ex-
pense of innocent materialmen and laborers. A surety, by virtue of its contract,
secures the contractor's promise to pay subcontractors and, therefore, such sub-
contractors should prevail.
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE: LOADING AND UN-
LOADING IN NEW YORK
The standard automobile liability policy provides that the insurance company
will:
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated
to pay ... because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time
resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile. 1
This language is present, in one form or another, both in the basic 2 and
family type3 policies covering private passenger vehicles, and in the compre-
hensive type policy 4 covering commercial vehicles. The latter is our prime
concern.
The popularly termed "omnibus" clause in private passenger 5 and com-
mercial vehicle" policies, states that the word "insured" includes any person
or organization using the vehicle or legally responsible for its use provided
that such activity is with the permission of the named insured. Thus, A, using
B's vehicle with B's permission in accordance with B's instructions or without
violating any restrictions imposed by B, is covered by B's policy where B,
had he done the act, would be covered. What constitutes a covered act, with
respect to a named insured or an "omnibus" insured, necessarily involves an
inquiry into the meaning of the phrase, "caused by accident and arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile."
While disputes concerning the meaning of the word "accident" in insurance
contracts have resulted in litigation in New York7 and elsewhere, it is generally
1. Standard Provisions for Automobile Liability Policies, Basic Automobile Liability
Form, Nat'l Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, p. 3, pt. I, 5th rev. April 1, 1955 [hereinafter cited
as Basic Automobile Liability Form].
2. Ibid.
3. Standard Provisions for Automobile Liability Policies, Family Automobile Form,
Nat'l Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, p. 3. Coverage A-B, 1st rev. May 1, 1958. [hereinafter
cited as Family Automobile Form].
4. Standard Provisions for Automobile Liability Policies, Comprehensive Automobile
Liability Form, Nat'l Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, p. 4, pt. I, 3d rev. April 1, 1955 [herein-
after cited as Comprehensive Automobile Liability Form].
5. Basic Automobile Liability Form, p. 3, pt. III(a); Family Automobile Form, p. 3,
Persons Insured (a)-(c).
6. Comprehensive Automobile Liability Form, p. 4, pt. III.
7. Jackson v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 139 Misc. 686, 248 N.Y. Supp. 207 (Sup.
Ct. 1931), aff'd mem., 234 App. Div. 893, 254 N.Y. Supp. 1010 (2d Dep't), aff'd mom., 259
N.Y. 559, 182 N.E. 180 (1932).
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accepted that the word refers to an act which causes injuries8 other than those
inflicted intentionally.P Such injuries then, are 'accdental... for the purpose
of indemnity according to the quality of the results rather than the quality of
the causes.""' The coverage for accidents arising out of the ownership of a
vehicle, coupled with the "omnibus" clause, is designed to protect the insured
from liability imposed by statute1 due to his status as the owner of the auto-
mobile.' - An accident arising out of the maintenance of the automobile is self-
e-xplanatory and would include, for example, a case where an insured, while
making repairs, negligently spilled a can of gasoline causing a fire.13 The
damage from such an accident, however, must be proximately caused by the
maintenance. 14
It remains then, to consider those accidents arising out of the usc of an
automobile. A covered vehicle must be used in accordance with the purposes
set forth in the policy or within the operations incidental to the business stated
therein.15 Use of the vehicle includes more than the mere operation of it by the
insured. If, for example, a policy required that the insured be operating the
vehicle at the time of the accident, no coverage would be afforded where the
owner was merely present in the vehicle while another person was operating it'G
unless the owner was exercising some actual physical control. 17 On the other
hand, one can be using a vehicle merely by riding in it as a passenger.18 With
little stretch of the imagination then, it can be seen that use can include a
multitude of activities, but in order for there to be coverage, there must be
S. Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mlass. 309, 131 N.E. 1S2 (1932); Commonwealth Cas. Co. v.
Headers, 113 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 273 (192S).
9. "The meaning of the term 'accident' is reasonably well established in our courts. It
ordinarily is defined as a sudden, unexpected event, identifiable in time and place .... The
general rule is that such incidents are accidents unless the injury is intentionally inflicted by
an insured or by another at his direction." Donovan, Hardy Perennials of Insurance Contract
Litigation, 1934 Ins. L.J. 163, 164.
10. Mlessersmith v. American Fid. Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 169, 133 N.E. 432, 433 (1921).
11. Every owner.. . shall be liable ... for death or injuries ... resulIing from ne.li-
gence ... by any person using or operating.. . with the permission, exprezs or implied, of
such owner. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 3S3(1).
12. Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 133, 209 N.Y.S2d 104 (2d Dep't 19C0).
13. United lut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jamestown Mlut. Ins. Co., 242 App. Div. 420, 275 N.Y.
Supp. 47 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 267 N.Y. 576, 196 N.E. 537 (1935).
14. Steir v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 227 App. Div. 37, 237 N.Y. Supp. 40 (1st Dcp't),
aff'd mem., 254 N.Y. 576, 173 N.E. 373 (1929).
15. Euto v. (American) Lumbermen's Mlut. Cas. Co., 247 App. Div. 613, 2S3 N.Y. Supp.
232 (4th Dep't 1936). In this case the policy expressly limited the insurer's liability to lo:
occurring from the use of a truck in connection with the insured's sand and gravel bu nes.
Thus, no coverage was afforded when the truck was involved in an accident while b ing uzcd
in snow removal.
16. Witherstine v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 235 N.Y. 163, 139 N.E. 229 (1923).
17. O'Connell v. New Jersey Fid. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 201 App. Div. 117, 193 N.Y.
Supp. 911 (3d Dep't 1922), aff'd mem., 235 N.Y. 533, 139 N.E. 744 (1923).
13. Jones v. New York Cas. Co., 23 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Va. 193S).
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a use' 9 with the permission,20 express or implied, 21 of the owner. Thus, what
constitutes use of an automobile, is not always clear and ultimately is a question
of fact.22 Of particular significance are cases involving the loading or unloading
of a vehicle. While loading 23 and unloading24 have been held to represent a
covered use even in the absence of the so-called "loading and unloading" clause,
it is this clause, found in policies covering commercial vehicles, 25 which con-
tinues to be the "source of considerable dispute and litigation." 2"
I. LOADING AND UNLOADING: THE CLAUSE AND THE EFFECT
A. Extended Coverage
The "loading and unloading" clause is, with rare exception, found in all
policies covering commercial vehicles. Obviously, under such a clause, should
the driver of a covered vehicle, while engaged in the act of loading or unload-
ing, injure a third party, the policy would protect him in the same way as
if he were driving the vehicle when the accident occurred.2 7 Whether you consider
19. See note 14 supra.
20. Farrell v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Misc. 2d 459, 189 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
21. Coons v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 701, 207 N.Y.S.2d 819
(3d Dep't 1960).
22. Compare Roche v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 247 App. Div. 335, 287 N.Y. Supp.
38 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 273 N.Y. 473, 6 N.E.2d 410 (1936), with Steir v. London Guar.
& Acc. Corp., 227 App. Div. 37, 237 N.Y. Supp. 40 (Ist Dep't), aff'd mer., 254 N.Y. 576, 173
N.E. 873 (1929).
23. A subcontractor, by means of a crane, loaded the vehicle covered by an automobile
policy which did not contain a loading and unloading clause. As the vehicle was on its
way to the highway, a rock fell from it injuring another. The court held that the loading
was a use of the vehicle, and, therefore, the one who loaded it was covered under the
automobile policy. D'Aquilla Bros. Contracting Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 22
Misc. 2d 733, 193 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
24. Where a pedestrian was struck and injured by an iron beam being moved across
the sidewalk from a truck into a building, the automobile policy covered this use of the
vehicle. Panhandle Steel Prods. Co. v. Fidelity Union Cas. Co., 23 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929). Similarly, where a woman being transported on a cot from her home to an
ambulance fell, the accident was within the use of the ambulance. Owens v. Ocean Acc. &
Guar. Corp., 194 Ark. 817, 109 S.W.2d 928 (1937).
25. Comprehensive Automobile Liability Form, Condition No. 4, p. 5 states the "use of
an automobile includes the loading and unloading thereof."
26. Hassett, Loading and Unloading, Addresses at Meeting of Insurance Law Section,
New York State Bar Ass'n, Rochester, N.Y., Oct. 31, 1959. One writer describes the clause,
as the "subject" instead of the cause of disputes in that the language is not ambiguous as a
matter of phraseology, but rather, "the continual disputes and litigation are attributable . ..
to the wide diversity of situations to which that language is pertinent." Donovan, Hardy
Perennials of Insurance Contract Litigation, 1954 Ins. L.J. 163, 164.
27. See Kemnetz v. Galluzzo, 8 Misc. 2d 513, 163 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1957) where
the truck operator dumped topsoil from the insured vehicle and then, while moving it to
its final place of delivery by means of a payloader, injured the plaintiff, such activity was
a use of the vehicle within the loading and unloading clause. See also B & D Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 181 Misc. 985, 43 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943), aff'd mem.,
267 App. Div. 955, 48 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 268 App. Div. 755, 49 N.Y.S.2d
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the "loading and unloading" clause as being "intended as a coverage exten-
sion .. ,,2 or, since loading and unloading is included in use of the vehicle
anyway,2 as a mere sales advantage,30 it is clear that the clause, as it has been
interpreted, creates some extension in coverage. 31
As courts began construing the meaning of this clause, two theories became
apparent, namely the "coming to rest"32 and the "complete operation" 33
doctrines. Under the former rule, unloading ceases when the article removed
from the vehicle has actually come to rest, and the vehicle is no longer engaged
in the process of unloading.34 Conversely, loading commences when the ar-
ticle has started on an uninterrupted movement towards being placed on or
in the vehicle.35 Under the latter doctrine, use has been extended to mean
the entire process of transportation, i.e., coverage extends from the moment
the goods leave their resting place until they reach their final destination'3
274 (1st Dep't 1944) where the insured's truckers were using a jigger to transport cartons
from the truck to the consignee's place of business and the jigger collided with the plaintiff,
such was a use of the vehicle within the loading and unloading clause. Cf. Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Tighe, 29 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Cal. 1939), aff'd, 115 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1940).
23. Fieting, The Loading and Unloading Coverage, 182 Weekly Underwriter 1112 (19C0).
29. D'Aquilla Bros. Contracting Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 22 MIsc. 2d 733,
193 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. CL 1959); see also Owens v. Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp., 194 Ark.
317, 109 S.W.2d 92S (1937); Panhandle Steel Prods. Co. v. Fidelity Union Cas. Co., 23
S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
30. Mautz, The Loading and Unloading Clause, 27 Ins. Counsel J. 150 (190).
31. August A. Busch & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 339 Mrus. 239, 153 X.E.2d 351
(1959); Ferry v. Protective Indem. Co., 155 Pa. Super. 266, 33 A.2d 493 (1944); Pacific
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 103 Utah 500, 161 P.2d 423 (1945).
32. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 103 Utah 50D, 503, 161 P.2d 423,
424 (1945).
33. Id. at 505, 161 P.2d at 425.
34. See Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226 Wis. 343, 276 N.W. 629 (1937) where a truck
driver delivering beer opened a hatchway on the sidewalk and a pedestrian fell into the
basement. Since the beer had come to rest, the vehicle was held to be no longer con-
nected with it, and, therefore, the accident did not occur in the process of unloading the
truck. See also Kaufman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F.2d S63 (3d Cir. 1959), revering
160 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Pa. 1953); American Cas. Co. v. Fisher, 195 Ga. 136, 23 SE2d
395, reversing 67 Ga. App. 784, 21 S.E.2d 306 (1942).
35. Ferry v. Protective Indem. Co., 155 Pa. Super. 266, 3S A.2d 493 (1944). In that case,
a truck driver left his vehicle at the curb and went into the basement of a building to re-
move ashes. In opening the door, while resting the ash can on a cellar step, he caused
a pedestrian to fall and be injured. The court held that the instrumentality which cauzzcd
the accident was the cellar door, and this, under the facts, did not come within the process
of loading the truck. See also Annot., 160 A.L.R. 1259, 1264 (1946).
36. Thus where a barrel of beer had been taken from the truck and placed on the ide-
walk preparatory to being taken through the customer's cellar door, and a pedestrian was
injured when the door was opened, the injury was considered covered under the unloading
clause of the automobile policy. State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v. District Court, 110
lont. 250, 100 P.2d 932 (1940). See also Coulter v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 333 Ill.
App. 631, 78 N.E.2d 131 (194S). Compare Ferry v. Protective Indem. Co., 155 Pa. Super.
266, 33 A.2d 493 (1944).
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The distinction between the two theories may be seen in the different results
reached in their application to similar fact patterns. Thus, where goods were
removed from the vehicle and placed on the sidewalk, under the "coming to rest"
rule, they were considered unloaded,37 while under the "complete operation"
doctrine it was held that,
unloading ... was a continuous operation from the time the truck came to a stop ...
and the [article] . . . was delivered to the customer. The unloading . . . cannot be
said to have been accomplished when the [article] ... was placed upon the sidewalk."8
Although it is possible, to have the same result under the "coming to rest"
rule39 as under the "complete operation" doctrine,40 as in a situation where the
unloading would be complete in either case, the theories are nonetheless dis-
tinguishable. However, the "coming to rest" rule "is losing its strength and is
fast being replaced even in jurisdictions once considered its champion ...
[T]he 'complete operation' doctrine has almost pre-empted the field."'41 With
respect to this broader view, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that it
"impresses us as sounder, as more fully carrying out the aim of the policy-to
cover the entire operation of making commercial pickups and deliveries in the
business of the insured carrier." 42 Accordingly, in New York, there is coverage
under the "loading and unloading" clause, where a person is injured due to the
negligence of the trucker or his employees, after the load has been placed on the
sidewalk and is being further transported.43 Likewise, coverage exists where
the accident occurs within a building a considerable distance from the vehicle, 44
or even in certain circumstances, where the transported material has been com-
pletely unloaded, but at the wrong address.45
B. The Big Parlay
The "omnibus" clause defines an "insured" as one using, or legally responsible
for the use of the vehicle with the insured's permission. 4" When the "omnibus"
clause is combined with the "loading and unloading" clause, it results in an
extension of coverage to any person using the vehicle by loading or unload-
ing it. Thus, under the "complete operation" doctrine where the employee
37. Franklin Co-op. Creamery Ass'n v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 200 Minn. 230, 273
N.W. 809 (1937).
38. State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v. District Court, 110 Mont. at 256, 100 P.2d at 934.
39. Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226 Wis. 348, 276 N.W. 629 (1937).
40. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 838, 212
N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
41. Risjord, Loading and Unloading, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 903, 904 (1960).
42. Wagman v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 304 N.Y. 490, 494, 109 N.E.2d 592, 594
(1952).
43. Kemnetz v. GaUuzzo, 8 Misc. 2d 513, 163 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
44. B & D Motor Lines, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 181 Misc. 985, 43 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1943), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 955, 48 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1st Dep't 1944).
45. Mohawk Valley Fuel Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 8 Misc. 2d 445, 448, 165 N.Y.S.2d 357,
361 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
46. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
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of a consignee was carrying cabinets across a sidewalk from where the truck
driver had deposited them, and a pedestrian was injured, the consignee's employee
was covered by the trucker's automobile policy because he was considered to be
using the vehicle at the time of the accident.47
The leading case on such extended coverage is Wagnian v. Avicrican Fid.
& Cas. Co.4s There, two employees of a clothing store were rolling garment
racks from a store to the curb where a truck operator lifted them onto his truck.
The plaintiff, an employee of the clothing store, was standing at the curb
counting garments and generally supervising the pickup. On his way back
to the store, he bumped into and injured a pedestrian on the sidewalk. The court
held that under the "complete operation" doctrine the plaintiff was engaged in
loading the vehicle and, thus, was entitled to protection as an "omnibus"
insured. In finding that he was covered by the vehicle's policy, the court noted
that had the plaintiff been employed by the trucker, and not the storekeeper, "the
evidence would unquestionably have warranted . . . [a] finding that his
activities in supervising and checking the pickup . . . had been part of the over-
all process of loading the vehicle." 9 In addition, the fact that he was on his
way back to the store, "would not suspend the coverage."'Z As one writer has
said: "Without necessarily conceding that the New York Court of Appeals was
correct in holding . . [that the plaintiff] was loading the truck,'"31 this case
is a perfect example of the extended coverage provided by the combination
of an "omnibus" clause and a "loading and unloading" clause.
C. Problems of Concurrent Coverage
1. Employee Exclusion
There is a division of authority on the question of whether an automobile
policy covers an "omnibus" insured where the injured party is the trucker's
employee.52 This is due to an exclusion in the policy which makes it inap-
plicable where an employee of the insured is injured in the course of employ-
ment and benefits for these injuries are required to be provided for by
workmen's compensation laws. 3
Initially, New York courts held that in such a situation coverage would be
denied the "omnibus" insured under the exclusion since it would be denied the
named insured if the suit were against himfr- Today, however, the exclusion
47. Lowry v. R. H. Mlacy & Co., 119 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
48. 304 N.Y. 490, 494, 1C9 N.E.2d 592, 594 (1952).
49. Id. at 495, 109 N.E.2d at 594.
50. Ibid.
51. Risjord, supra note 41, at 933.
52. Gozigian, Who Is "The Insured" In The Employee Excuslon Clause?, 10 Syracuse
L. Rev. 11S (1953).
53. "This policy does not apply ... (c) ... to any obligation for which the inzurcd or
any carrier as his insurer may be held liable under any workmen's compensation, unemploy-
ment compensation or disability benefits law, or under any similar la% .... " Comprehensve
Automobile Liability Form, p. 5.
54. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 199 Misc. 65S, 101) N.Y.S.2d 79
(Sup. CL 1950), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 446, 119 N.Y.S.2d 795 (4th Dep't 1953).
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applies only where the claimant is an employee of the person against whom the
claim is made-the "omnibus" insured-and, since an injured trucker's em-
ployee is not such an employee, the "omnibus" insured will not be denied
coverage.55 The reasoning behind this is that:
To hold that the exclusion clause was intended to deny coverage to an additional in-
sured who did not and could not carry workmen's compensation insurance to protect
himself ... would seem to be contrary to what actually was intended.50
This point, however, should be made academic by the addition of a "Sever-
ability of Interests"5 7 provision in the standard policy, but "unfortunately, some
of the courts haven't yet discovered that purpose." '
2. Comprehensive General Liability
Generally, the "premises occupier"59 will have a comprehensive general lia-
bility policy 0 which insures against accidents"' but which rarely covers its
employees. Such a policy also covers the ownership, maintenance and use,
including the loading and unloading, of automobiles when the accident occurs
on the premises or the ways immediately adjoining. 62 In addition to this, the
"premises occupier" may have an automobile policy, either separately 8 or in
combination with its general liability policy,64 which may cover the use of hired 5
55. Greaves v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 4 App. Div. 2d 609, 168 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1st
Dep't 1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 120, 155 N.E.2d 390, 181 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1959); Morgan v.
Greater N.Y. Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 305 N.Y. 243, 112 N.E.2d 273 (1953).
56. 4 App. Div. 2d at 612, 168 N.Y.S.2d at 109-10.
57. "The term 'the insured' is used severally and not collectively .... " Comprehensive
Automobile Liability Form, p. 6.
58. Brown & Risjord, Loading and Unloading: The Conflict Between Fortuitous Ad-
versaries, 29 Ins. Counsel J. 197, 209 (1962).
59. For the purposes of simple illustration, this term shall be used to include premises
owners, consignors, consignees, and any one from whom the goods are being picked up by
the trucker or to whom they are being delivered.
60. Standard Provisions for General Liability Policies, Comprehensive General Liability
Form, Nat'l Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 3d rev. July 6, 1955 [hereinafter cited as Com-
prehensive General Liability Form].
61. "Insuring Agreements . .. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury .. .
sustained by any person and caused by accident." Id. at 4.
62. "This policy does not apply . . . (c) . . . to the ownership, maintenance, operation,
use, loading or unloading of ... (2) automobiles if the accident occurs away from such
premises or the ways immediately adjoining. . . ." Ibid.
63. Comprehensive Automobile Liability Form.
64. Standard Provisions For General-Automobile Liability Policies, Comprehensive Gen-
eral-Automobile Liability Form, Nat'l Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 2d rev. July 6, 1955
[hereinafter cited as Comprehensive General-Automobile Liability Form].
65. "The unqualified word 'insured' includes .. . any person while using .. . a hired
automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided
the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission .... " Com-
prehensive Automobile Liability Form, p. 4; Comprehensive General-Automobile Liability
Form, p. 5.
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or nonowned automobiles.66 It is provided in a general liability policy that if
the insured is covered by any other insurance, in the event of a loss, the policy
will cover only to the proportion that the total amount of coverage bears to the
total amount of coverage of the other available insurance.07 This is prorating
the loss. The standard automobile policy covering commercial vehicleS09 and
the combination general liability automobile policy 9 contain this same condi-
tion, and in addition, provide that if the loss arises out of use of a hired auto-
mobile insured on a cost of hire basis,7" or a nonowned automobile, the policy
shall not be prorated, but rather shall be in excess of other available insurance.-'
In light of such abundant coverage and its attendant conditions, consider the
situation where a truck driver or third party is injured due to the negligence of
the "premises occupier's" employee who is engaged in loading or unloading.
Where the liability of the "premises occupier" is more than vicarious, it would be
covered concurrently by both its general liability policy and the trucker's auto-
mobile policy. That is to say, it would be the named insured under the former
and an "omnibus" insured under the latter. The loss would then be prorated
among both insurance carriers.72 This assumes, of course, that the trucker's
vehicle was not a hired or nonowned vehicle for, if such were the case, the auto-
mobile policy would be in excess of other available insurance. The "premises
occupier" in this situation cannot recover over against its employee because both
are joint tort-feasors.7 3
On the other hand, where the liability of the "premises occupier" is vicarious
only, the stage may be set for a "battle between fortuitous adversaries."74 Here,
66. "The unqualified word 'insured' includes ... any executive officer of the named
insured with respect to the use of a non-owned automobile in the business of the named
insured." Ibid.
67. "If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this policy the com-
pany shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such lo2s than the
applicable limit of liability ... bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid
and collectible insurance against such loss." Comprehensive General Liability Form, Con-
dition No. 12, p. 6. Thus, if the general liability policy provides coverage to $20,CUD
and an auto policy with coverage to $40,000 covers the same lozs, the general liability
carrier will pay $20 to every $40 paid by the auto carrier. Convers-ely, if the auto
policy only has coverage to $10,000, the general liability carrier will pay ,Z0 to every
$10 paid by the auto carrier.
6S. Comprehensive Automobile Liability Form, Condition No. 14, p. 6.
69. Comprehensive General-Automobile Liability Form, Condition No. 14, p. S.
70. "[Tlhe words 'cost of hire' mean the amount incurred for hired automobiles, in-
cluding the entire remuneration of each employee of the named insured engaged in the
operation of such automobiles subject to an average weekly maximum remuneration of $100,
provided that such amount shall not indude any amount incurred for the hire of any such
automobiles which are subject to compulsory insurance requirements of any federal or
public authority... ." Comprehensive Automobile Liability Form, Condition No. 1(1), p. S;
Comprehensive General-Automobile Liability Form, Condition No. 1(6), p. 7.
71. See notes 6S & 69 supra.
72. Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Aach. Inc., 90 So. 2d 417 (La. Ct App. 1956).
73. Id. at 428-29.
74. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul-Mfercury Indem. Co., 243 F.2d 50, 511 (Sth
Cir. 1957).
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as in Wagman,75 the "premises occupier," guided by its general liability
carrier, would bring a third party action against its negligent employee who
would not be covered by the policy. The employee, in turn, would seek coverage
under the automobile policy as an "omnibus" insured. The "premises occupier"
would be covered concurrently by its general liability policy and the trucker's
automobile policy. However, it could recover against the active tort-feasor, its
employee, who would be covered only under the automobile policy. By doing
this, the automobile carrier would have to bear the whole loss,70 while if the
employee were not brought into the suit, the loss would be prorated. 77 To
seek a full recovery against the automobile carrier without joining the employee,
the "premises occupier" would be "asking for relief that it may never be entitled
to obtain."78 Affirmative proof is required to show that the employee was
negligent, notwithstanding the fact that the "premises occupier" is held deriva-
tively liable because of its employee's negligence.70 This somewhat tortured
form of litigation, coupled with the fact that the general liability carrier lurks in
the background guiding its insured's action against its employee, and the latter's
suit against the automobile carrier, has not passed without uncomplimentary
comment 8 0
Of course, if the "premises occupier's" employee is covered as an insured under
the general liability policy, coverage by both carriers would be prorated whether
liability was vicarious or not. Again, we are assuming that the trucker's vehicle
is not hired or nonowned. Should the "premises occupier" have coverage for
hired vehicles on a cost of hire basis,81 or nonowned vehicles,82 the coverage
would be in excess and would be used only when the trucker's policy had been
exhausted. 8 3
75. 304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592 (1952).
76. Ibid.; accord, Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 228 F.2d 365
(9th Cir. 1955); Pleasant Valley Lima Bean Growers & Warehouse Ass'n v. Cal-Farm Ins.
Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 126, 298 P.2d 109 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
77. Lamberti v. Anaco Equip. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 121, 226 N.Y.S,2d 70 (1st Dep't
1962).
78. Id. at 126, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
79. Id. at 126, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75.
80. See generally Brown & Risjord, supra note 58.
81. See notes 65 & 70 supra.
82. See note 66 supra. Note, however, that as regards nonowned vehicles, such must be
used by an executive officer of the named insured for coverage to exist at all.
83. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. In Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1954) the court held that the hired auto coverage
applied under the facts, but decided that the loss would be prorated. This was due to the
fact that the policy of the "premises occupier" was peculiarly worded so that coverage was
in excess as to nonowned autos but not as to hired autos. The court also stated that the
"other insurance" condition applied only to other insurance purchased by the "premises oc-
cupier," but in fact, it applies to any other insurance available to any possible insured. See
Woodrich Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Co. of No. America, 252 Minn. 86, 89 N.W.2d 412 (1958).
See generally Clampett, Coverage Under the Automobile Liability Policy and Under the
Comprehensive General Liability Policy When an Employee of the Former's Named Insured
Is Injured Through the Negligence of the Latter's Insured During a Loading or Unloading
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I. THE PRESENT STATUS Or NEW YoR LAWi
A. Generally
As previously noted, New York follows the "complete operation" doctrine, i.e.,
extending loading or unloading to cover the entire process of making commercial
pickups and deliveries. 4 Furthermore, in the leading case on the subject, the
New York Court of Appeals has recognized that the "omnibus" clause may be
parlayed with the "loading and unloading" clause to extend coverage to a third
party other than an employee of the trucker. Under "complete operation," un-
loading continues until the material being unloaded reaches its final destination sm
even if the accident occurs within the building in which the consignee is located s8
or where the delivery is complete and the material is deposited at a wrong
address.63 However, even under this broad interpretation, there is a point at
which a court may find the loading or unloading either completed or not yet
begun.90 The mere fact that loading or unloading occurred will not compel
coverage where there is no proof of negligence in the process.0 1
B. Where the Driver Is Injured
In cases where a truck driver is injured, the exclusion clause does not bar
coverage to an "omnibus" insured. -12 Thus, where a "premises occupier's" em-
ployee is negligent in loading, causing injury to the truck driver, he will be coy-
Operation, 25 Ins. Counsel J. 19 (1958); Gowan, Liability Insurance-Loading and Un-
loading," 1951 Ins. L. 745; Gowan, Loading and Unloading-Hired Cars-Concurrent
Coverage-Industry Recommendations, 26 Ins. Counsel J. 93 (1959); Gowan, Products
Liability Insurance-Duplicate Policies-Concurrent Coverage-Industry Recommenda-
tions-Loading and Unloading, 26 Ins. Counsel J. 411 (1959).
84. Hudson River Concrete Prods. Corp. v. Callanan Rd. Improvement Co., 5 App.
Div. 2d 49, 16S N.Y.S.2d Sol (3d Dep't 1957); Kemnetz v. Galluzzo, 3 Misc. 2d 513, 163
N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Krasilovsky Bros. Trucking Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
54 N.Y.S.2d 60 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945); B & D Motor Line:, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 181
Misc. 9S5, 43 N.Y.S.2d 4S6 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 955, 48 N.Y.S2d
472 (1st Dep't 1944).
S5. Wagman v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592 (1952).
86. Kemnetz v. Galluzzo, 8 Misc. 2d 513, 163 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. CL 1957).
87. B & D Motor Lines, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 181 Misc. 985, 43 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1943), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 955, 48 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Ist Dep't 1944).
8S. Mohawk Valley Fuel Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 8 Misc. 2d 445, 165 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup.
CL 1957) which holds that delivery is not complete until the goods reach their final
destination.
89. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 838, 212
N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
90. General Acc. & Life Assur. Corp. v. Jarmuth, 150 N.Y.S.2d S36 (Sup. CL 1956).
Compare J. Scheer & Son Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 229 N.YS.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
with Pellicano v. Royal Indem. Co., 229 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
91. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 853, 181
N.Y.S.2d 813 (2d Dep't 1959).
92. See note 55 supra.
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ered.0 3 There are two cases, however, where a truck driver was injured and
coverage was denied to a consignee and consignor, respectively.
In Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 94 a truck driver was
loading bags of napthalene from a pier and was injured in the process. He
brought an action against the shipowner alleging negligence in improperly
packaging and storing the bags and in permitting the napthalene to be subjected
to exposure from the elementsY5 The shipowner settled the action and then
sought reimbursement under the trucker's policy claiming to be an "omnibus"
insured under the "loading and unloading" clause.00 The court found that there
was no negligence on the part of the driver in loading the goods nor was it
alleged,0 7 and, therefore, there was no liability under the "loading and un-
loading" clause.9 8
In Eastern Chems., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co.,90 a truck driver carried chem-
icals to the plaintiff's plant and began unloading the vehicle. During the process,
but at a time when there was no unloading taking place, one of the containers
on the truck exploded and injured the truck driver. The driver sued Eastern, the
consignee and manufacturer, who in turn sought coverage under the trucker's
policy as an "omnibus" insured. 100 Because the injured driver had expressly
disclaimed any negligence in the unloading process and because he based his
cause of action against Eastern on the allegation that the latter was negligent
in shipping inherently dangerous matter, the court held that Eastern was not
covered by the policy.1 1 Citing Moore-McCormack,10 2 the court stated that there
must be some negligence in the unloading process for there to be coverage.' 03 It
intimated, however, that it is not necessary for an employee of the consignee to
be engaged in unloading in order for the consignee to qualify as an "omnibus"
insured.' 0 4 This point may be somewhat obscured by the wording in the policy
-which requires that an "omnibus" insured be using the vehicle. But even in the
absence of an affirmative act, a person will be covered as an "omnibus" insured
if he is legally responsible for the use of the vehicle. 10 One who is negligent in
failing to exercise supervision then, can be an "omnibus" insured under the
93. Ibid.
94. 181 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
95. Id. at 855.
96. Id. at 856.
97. Ibid.
98. Id. at 857. The court cited as authority Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 853, 181 N.Y.S.2d 813 (2d Dep't 1959).
99. 23 Misc. 2d 1024, 199 N.Y.S.2d 48 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
100. Id. at 1024, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
101. Id. at 1027, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. There was apparently no employee of Eastern engaged in the unloading, and, there-
fore, the court said "there can be no doubt that Eastern would be an additional assured . , .
if the accident . . . was caused by some negligent act in the 'loading or unloading.'" Id. at
1026, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
105. Tri-State Concrete, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 384, 172
N.Y.S.2d 123 (3d Dep't 1958).
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policy.' 08 In fact, it has been held that a consignor's attaching of a heater to the
vehicle to protect the material being shipped is a use of that vehicle.10 7
It can be observed from Eastern and Moore-McCormack that where the truck
driver is injured and no negligence in the loading or unloading operation is
alleged, or negligence in the operation is expressly denied, the consignee or con-
signor will not be covered as an "omnibus" insured. It should also be noted
that where no employees of the consignee or consignor are involved in the
operation, the trucker will never allege negligence in the loading or unloading for
fear that he would be barred as being contributorily negligent. It is a much safer
course, indeed, to allege some other source of negligence. Is something else, how-
ever, to be extracted from these cases? Suppose the container in Eastcrn, while
it was being unloaded by the manufacturer's employee, had exploded and in-
jured the truck driver or a third party. Does it seem reasonable that the truck-
er's automobile policy should protect the manufacturer? Both Eastern"0 3 and
Moore-McCorzmack 10 hold that there must be negligence in the loading or
unloading. The mere fact that an employee of the manufacturer enters the
picture should not change the conclusion. It would seem there should be
a causal connection'" between the loading or unloading operation and the
injury. While the policy requires only that the accident arise "out of the...
use" including loading and unloading, and not that it be caused by the use, it
would seem that Eastern and Moore-McCormack qualify the policy to the
extent that the accident must arise out of the neglig nt use.
C. Instrumentality
The instrumentality cases involve situations where some instrument or piece
of equipment is used in the loading or unloading operation. Again, if the trucker
or his employee is negligent in using an instrumentality, there is, of course,
106. Id. at 337, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
107. Ar-Glen Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., S Misc. 2d 5S9, 167 X.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct.
1957).
108. 23 Misc. 2d 1024, 199 N.YS.2d 43.
109. 131 F. Supp. 854.
110. "Assuming that we are inclined in this State toward the 'complete op2ration' theory
in determining what constitutes the loading of a vehicle, these words are not a formula
that embraces everything that may have been done prior to the immediate effort of loading.
The line of demarcation must be reasonably drawn. ... [Tihe risk ... created . . . v.-as
not one which accompanied this loading, and was therefore not one which would be within
the contemplation of the insurer and the carrier in entering into the insuring agreement."
Wagman v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 304 N.Y. 490, 493-99, 109 N.E.2d 592, 596 (1952) (dis-
senting opinion). "[1]n holding that the vehicle insurance coverage continues until delivery is
completed, none of the leading decisions... purport to extend the unloading clause coverage
to acts or omissions of the consignee or other third persons which are not reasonably or
normally a part of the deliver, function. . . .We must not lose eight of the fact that we
are dealing with a policy primarily written to cover liability in connection with the ...
use of a vehicle. ... Moreover, there is clear authority for the limiting of the coverage to
accidents which are causally related to the use and unloading of the vehicle." Lamberti v.
Anaco Equip. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 121, 126-27, 226 N.Y.S.2d 70, 75-76 (dizenting
opinion).
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coverage."' However, the cases where the one using the instrumentality is an
"omnibus" insured present a problem. In Lamberti v. Anaco Equip. Carp., 112
the injured party was the driver of a transit-mix concrete truck. The truck
delivered concrete mixed on the truck to the job-site where it was poured into
the bucket of a crane operated by an employee of a subcontractor. While being
hoisted, the bucket tipped and some concrete fell and injured the driver who was
standing on his truck waiting to refill the bucket.
The driver recovered in a suit against the subcontractor and the latter ap-
pealed the dismissal of its third party action against the insurance carrier seeking
coverage as an "omnibus" insured under the policy issued to the truck owner.
The court said:
The issue can be stated very simply. Did the accident occur in the course of the
"unloading" of the truck? If it did then ... [the subcontractor] was an insured under
the liability policy [of the trucker] .... 113
Citing the broad interpretation in Wagman, the court found that the accident
occurred in the course of unloading, and that the subcontractor was an "omnibus"
insured under the trucker's policy. The dissenting opinion urged that the
unloading was completed prior to the accident because the matter of getting the
concrete to a specified part of the building was no concern of the truck carrier. 114
This argument was logically answered by the majority which noted that,
by the very nature of that material it is essential that it be taken directly from the...
truck to the place at which it becomes a permanent portion of the construction ...
[and] it is for that very reason that a transit-mix truck is used in this ... operation. 110
While recognizing the "complete operation" doctrine, the dissent also argued
that there must nevertheless be some causal connection, which in this case was
broken when the consignee took full and exclusive possession and control of the
goods after they left the truck. 116 Without denying that there should be some
type of casual connection between the use, as demonstrated by the unloading,
and the injury sustained, the contention that this connection is broken when the
consignee takes full and exclusive possession and control of the goods is at odds
with the reasoning of Lowry v. R. H. Macy & Co.1 7 There, the consignee,
who had full and exclusive possession and control of the goods, injured a
pedestrian while carrying the goods across the sidewalk, and still, he was
covered by the trucker's policy.
111. Kemnetz v. Galluzzo, 8 Misc. 2d 513, 163 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Krasllov-
sky Bros. Trucking Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 54 N.Y.S.2d 60 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945); B
& D Motor Lines, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 181 Misc. 985, 43 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. City Ct.
1943), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 955, 48 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1st Dep't 1944).
112 16 App. Div. 2d 121, 226 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1st Dep't 1962).
113. Id. at 123, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
114. Id. at 128, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The dissent urged this contention but noted that
consideration must be given to "the nature .. .of the merchandise . .. [and] the normal
custom and practices concerning delivery of the same .... ." Ibid.
115. Id. at 125, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 73-74.
116. Id. at 127, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
117. 119 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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In R. H. Macy & Co. v. General Ace. Assur. Corp.,n s a truck was backed to
a platform where skids were supplied by MIacy's employees. One of the skids
which was near the truck was defective. The seller's employee was standing on
the defective skid, "as yet unused, and momentarily [he] stepped off it. When
he did so the defect therein caused him to fall."119 There was no mention of a
"loading and unloading" clause in the trucker's insurance policy, but the court
held that MNacy was covered under the automobile policy as a "user of the
vehicle."'2' 3 It stated: "[T]he contention that the policy was not intended
to cover Mlacy's negligence in furnishing a defective skid overlooks the fact that
the skid was then factually utilized to facilitate the unloading operation."12 1
Both Lamberti and General Accident followed the "complete operation"
doctrine and employed the device, originally promulgated in Wagman, of
combining the "omnibus" with the "loading and unloading" clause. The
Lamberti case is certainly in line with the reasoning of Eastern and Moore-
McCormack, namely, the accident must arise out of the negligcnt loading or
unloading. And, assuming the court was correct in holding that the skid was
being "factually utilized" in the unloading, General Accident also follows the
requirements set out in Eastern and Moore-McCormack. In Lamberti the ap-
pellate division extended coverage to an "omnibus" insured using an instru-
mentality.'2m The General Accident case represents a further extension in that
there, the supreme court provided coverage for an "omnibus" insured who used
a defective instrumentality in unloading. Had the skid in General Accident not
been defective, there would be no difference between this case and Lambcrti.
D. The Distinction
Utilizing the reasoning of General Accident, it follovws that if in that case the
loading platform had collapsed due to Mlacy's defective construction or main-
tenance, overloading not being a factor, Mlacy would be covered under the
automobile policy as one engaged in an unloading operation. Furthermore, if the
goods were being transported up a flight of stairs which collapsed, since the
unloading was not complete until they reached their final destination, 'Macy
would be covered. And if the crane in Lambcrti were defective and had
caused the damage, coverage would still be afforded. Indeed, might not
coverage be afforded even to a consignee whose defective sidewalk resulted in an
injury to a trucker engaged in unloading?2 3
118. 4 Misc. 2d 89, 148 NA..S.2d 10 (Sup. CL 195).
119. Id. at 90, 14S N.Y.S.2d at 12.
120. Id. at 91, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 12. Due to facy's failure to fulfill the policy conditions
as to cooperation and notice, coverage was denied, there being "no obligation on the part
of the defendant, General Accident... ." Id. at 92, 14S N.Y.S.2d at 14.
121. Id. at 91, 14S N.Y.S.2d at 12.
122. This extension was not without precedent. See Lowry v. R. H. Macy & Co, 119
N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1952). Where the party using the instrumentality to load or unload
is the trucker or his employee, coverage has long been recognized. See note il supra.
123. In such a case, the injured party would probably not allege negligence in the un-
loading, as in Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 181 F. Supp. 854
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), or specifically deny that there was any negligence in the operation, as in
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Such reasoning ignores the absence of a causal connection between the un-
loading operation and the accident.124 In General Accident and the instances
hypothesized, it was the defective skid, loading platform, stairs, and crane that
caused the accident and not the negligent unloading. While it is true that the
policy only requires that the accident arise out of the use and not that it be
caused by it, there should also be some type of causal connection between the
two. This has been recognized in other jurisdictions 12 r as well as in the dis-
senting opinions in Wagmnan and Lamberti.120 Even in New York, where injury
is sustained during the unloading operation, and it is claimed that the "injuries
occurred through causes wholly unrelated to 'loading and unloading' . . . on
the basis of such a claim . . . there is no coverage. . ".."27 In fact, in a case
where a plaintiff, while walking towards a bus, was injured when she fell over
a stanchion and chains, it was held that "the maintenance and operation of the
buses was not the proximate cause of the accident .. .. ,128
But what test should be used in determining whether the accident was caused
by the loading or unloading operation, or by some other factor? The test, of
course, should be the intent of the parties to the insurance contract, namely,
the trucker and his insurer. Mr. Justice Cardozo, while sitting on the New York
Court of Appeals, stated:
General definitions of a proximate cause give little aid. Our guide is the reasonable
expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when making an ordinary
business contract. It is his intention, express or fairly to be inferred, that counts. There
are times when the law permits us to go far back in tracing events to causes. The
inquiry for us is how far the parties to this contract intended us to go. The causes
within their contemplation are the only causes that concern us.129
Eastern Chems., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 23 Misc. 2d 1024, 199 N.Y.S.2d 48 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
124. One writer notes that "the courts have inquired into the question of causal relation-
ship, and have pointed out that a causal relationship must exist between the loading or
unloading and the damages sustained. That this is not more frequently discussed .. . would
seem more reasonably attributable to the court's belief that the requirement has been met
in the particular case in which it is not discussed, rather than to a rejection of the re-
quirement." Note, The Scope of Loading and Unloading Clauses in Automobile Insurance
Policies, 1 N.Y.L.F. 95, 97 (1955).
125. Maryland Cas. Co. v. United Corp., 35 F. Supp. 570 (D. Mass. 1940); Pacific Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 108 Utah 500, 161 P.2d 423 (1945); Handley v.
Oakley, 10 Wash. 2d 396, 116 P.2d 833 (1941). New Jersey has held that there is a causal
connection if the loading or unloading is the efficient cause of the accident. Maryland Cas,
Co. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 48 N.J. Super. 314, 137 A.2d 577 (Super. Ct.), aff'd,
28 N.J. 17, 145 A.2d 15 (1958) (per curiam). See Note, The Scope of Loading and Un-
loading Clauses in Automobile Insurance Policies, 1 N.Y.L.F. 95 (1955).
126. See note 110 supra.
127. Eastern Chems., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 23 Misc. 2d 1024, 1027, 199 N.Y.S.2d
48, 52 (Sup. Ct. 1960). In this case the injured party made the claim and the decision
was keyed to the allegations in the complaint.
128. Forgion v. Travelers Ins. Co., 171 Misc. 163, 164, 12 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (N.Y. City Ct.
1939), aff'd mem., 260 App. Div. 1031, 24 N.Y.S.2d 366 (2d Dep't 1940).
129. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 51, 120 N.E. 86, 87 (1918).
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It is hardly likely that one taking out a policy to cover the operations of his
vehicle would, as a reasonable businessman, have the epectation and purpose
of covering consignors and consignees for their negligence in maintaining unsafe
premises or equipment. Nor does it seem reasonable to believe that it was the
intention of the parties to the insurance policy to cover, in particular, one who
negligently stored napthalene, as in Moore-McCorwack, or one who negligently
shipped a dangerous chemical, as in Eastern. While perhaps insurance companies
should expect, in view of the decisions, that policies will be interpreted broadly,
it cannot be said that they should expect all the results that have been hypoth-
esized as consistent with General Accident; nor even that they should expect
the same result as reached in General Accident itself, were a similar set
of facts to recur. The court in that case, it is submitted, was in error. It
extended coverage so far beyond the intention of the parties to the insurance
contract that it vitiated their purpose. The circle of coverage should be extended
to include Lamberti, and no further.
One argument which might be advanced to extend coverage to an "omnibus"
insured in a situation such as we have been considering, is that the "loading
and unloading" clause is ambiguous. Ambiguities in an insurance contract are
resolved in favor of the insured, presumably including an "omnibus" insured. 12 o
But it is also submitted that the clause is not ambiguous.' 3 '
III. CONCLUSION
While insurance carriers may agree that coverage under the "loading and
unloading" clause should not, and will not, be extended to one other than the
trucker or his employee who causes an accident by furnishing or using defec-
tive equipment or premises, General Accident notwithstanding, they have
sought to protect each other from claims to the contrary.
Representing a large number of insurance companies, the Combined Claims
Committee' - has made recommendations for the handling of certain concurrent
coverage problems, such as situations involving loading and unloading. Where a
vehicle is being loaded or unloaded at a customer's premises and the driver or a
third party is injured by reason of the negligence of the employees of the
customer, the Committee has recommended that the auto carrier should cover.'3
Where an accident occurs in loading or unloading the vehicle by reason of the
defective equipment provided by the customer, the Committee has recommended
that the carrier of the insured owning the defective equipment should bear the
130. An automobile policy excluding loading and unloading coverage was held to be
ambiguous and construed against the insurance company in Muller v. Sun Indem. Co., 276
App. Div. 102S, 96 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep't 1950), aft'd, 302 N.Y. 634, 97 N.E.2d 7 0 (1951).
See also Tonkin v. California Ins. Co., 294 N.Y. 326, 62 N.E.2d 215 (1945); Hartol Prods.
Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 290 N.Y. 44, 47 N.E.2d 6S7 (1943).
131. Donovan, Hardy Perennials of Insurance Contract Litigation, 1954 Ins. LJ. 163.
132. The Combined Claims Committee is composed of executives from thrce trade as-
sociations: The Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, The National Asociation of
Mutual Casualty Companies, and the National Association of Independent Insurers.
133. Recommendations of Combined Claims Committee on Handling of Certain Con-
current Coverage Problems, Letter of July 21, 195S.
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liability.T M Thus, if a crane being used in loading or unloading causes injury,
the carrier of the owner of the crane should cover. 138 -owever, the Committee
has not as yet issued any recommendations regarding accidents caused by a de-
fective condition on the premises, such as a weak staircase, a broken sidewalk
and so forth.13 6 Furthermore, the Committee is completely powerless to force
even those companies which agree to follow its recommendations, to abide by
them. The Committee has pointed out that the recommendations "are advisory
only ...have no force of law and by indicating an intention to follow them
... no company is committing itself. . . ."13 Further, they are not expected
to be followed contrary to local law.' 38
Policy revision, however, rather than recommendations for handling these
situations under present policy provisions would seem to be the better solution.
But this is not a new suggestion. 39 It seems simple enough to prevent the
extension of coverage beyond the apogee 140 of the arc, by adding to the auto-
mobile policy an exclusion which would make the policy inapplicable to anyone
using, loading or unloading the vehicle, other than the named insured or his
employee, who uses as a means, any defective instrumentality or premises.
Undoubtedly, there is a practical roadblock to policy revision, namely, a meeting
of the minds of the automobile, general liability, combination and insurers in
general. This obstacle, however, is not insurmountable, and indeed, if a revision
operated only to avoid coverage to an "omnibus" insured who is responsible for
defective equipment or premises, there is no reason why it could not be under-
taken unilaterally. Such a revision should not affect a policy's attractiveness to
the public, in that it does not delete previously provided coverage to the named
insured and, in fact, fulfills his intention to avoid paying premiums for a risk
which should be borne wholly by the party responsible for the defective equip-
ment or premises.
Members of the insurance industry feel that "the courts have aggravated the
problem by extending the sphere of the loading and unloading processes to
134. Ibid.
135. One writer on the subject feels that the Committee's recommendations should be
amended to have the carrier for~the owner of any mechanical equipment used in loading or
unloading afford primary coverage, whether the equipment was defective or not, and whether
or not the accident resulted from the sole negligence of the operator of such equipment.
Gowan, Loading and Unloading-Hired Cars-Concurrent Coverage-Industry Recom-
mendations, 26 Ins. Counsel J. 93, 99 (1959).
136. Such conditions may come under loading and unloading by virtue of being "factually
utilized to facilitate the ... operation." R. H. Macy & Co. v. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur.
Corp., 4 Misc. 2d 89, 91, 148 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
137. Recommendations of Combined Claims Committee of Certain Concurrent Coverage
Problems, Letter of March 4, 1959.
138. This is not to say that the Committee's recommendations have no effect. The Com-
mittee, itself, is a meritorious undertaking helping to reduce inter-company litigation. It
relies on the good faith of the member companies subscribing to its recommendations.
139. Alexander, Border Lines of Automobile Liability Coverage-Loading and Unloading
Claims, 147 Weekly Underwriter 460-63 (1942).
140. See, e.g., Lamberti v. Anaco Equip. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 121, 226 N.Y.S.2d 70
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sometimes unrealistic limits."1-  It has been said, somewhat belligerently,
that "when it comes to construing policies, give a judge as much as a superfluous
apostrophe and he'll hang his hat on it."'' 42 However, the industry is also aware
that "the result manifestly is not wholly chargeable to the courts. It must be
shared by the automobile insurers who have, by the loading and unloading
clause,' 14 3 been responsible for such extended coverage. Knowing then what
the law is, and what could conceivably follow in the way of extended coverage, 44
the insurance companies should not be heard to cry "foul" at some adverse
verdict construing the "loading and unloading" clause, in the absence of a real
effort on their part to revise their policies and avoid such results.
141. Fieting, The Loading and Unloading Coverage, 182 Weekly Underwriter 12G9
(1960).
142. Alexander, supra note 139, at 46.
143. Fieting, supra note 141.
144. E.g., R. H. Alacy & Co. v. General Acc. Fire & Life Azsur. Corp., 4 Busc. Zd S9,
14S N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Although Aloore-McCormack and Eastern both state that
there must be negligence in the loading or unloading operation, the court in Lamberti
stated: "The means by which the material is removed from a truck is of no particular con-
sequence, whether the removal be effected by a rack, by hand or by a crane. ... The sole
test is whether the means used was in the process of unloading." 16 App. Div. 2d at 124,
226 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
